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All but two professional baseball leagues have adopted the “designated hitter” (DH) rule, 
which allows a team’s manager to designate a player to bat at the plate and run the bases in 
place of another player, usually the team’s pitcher.  Unlike the team’s other players, the 
designated hitter does not take the field to play defense.  This paper provides a survey of a 
large literature investigating the DH rule’s effect on the incentives of pitchers to hit batters 
and on changes in the number of hit batsmen. We also consider whether the DH rule provides 
a good example of a natural experiment, as some professional baseball leagues were “treated” 
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The game of baseball has been played with a set of playing rules that have varied 
little across countries and over time.    Nine players play nine innings; each team bats until it 
makes three outs; three strikes is an out; and so on.    There has, however, been one major 
revision to the rules of play that all but two professional baseball leagues have adopted.   
Known as the “designated hitter” (DH) rule, it allows a team’s manager to designate a player 
to bat at the plate and run the bases in place of another player, usually the team’s pitcher.   
Unlike the team’s other players, the designated hitter does not take the field to play defense.   
In modern professional baseball, where skill specialization is rigorously pursued, the 
designated hitter is an offensive specialist, whereas a pitcher is a defensive specialist. 
 
  To some fans and regular observers of the game, the DH rule represents “a radical 
departure from the game’s formerly fundamental principal that every player should both 
come to bat and play a position in the field” (Zorn and Gill, 2007, p. 192).
2 To many sports 
economists, the DH rule represents a change in the constraints and opportunity costs faced by 
players, team managers, and general managers.    In particular, there have been numerous 
studies regarding the DH rule’s effect on the incentives of pitchers to hit batters and on 
changes in the number of hit batsmen.    Section I provides a survey of this literature. 
 
To some sports economists, the change to the DH rule is a good example of a natural 
experiment, as some professional baseball leagues were “treated” with the DH rule and others 
were not treated.    The coexistence of multiple treatment and comparison groups could allow 
researchers to identify and estimate the effects of the introduction of the DH rule on fan, team, 
and player actions.    Section II examines whether the introduction of the DH rule is a good 
example of a natural experiment.    Section III concludes with some thoughts about how this 
research has contributed to our understanding of baseball and, more generally, of economics.       
 
I. DEBATE ON DH RULE, HIT BATSMEN AND MORAL HAZARD 
 
In the United States and Canada, the American League of Major League Baseball 
                                                  
2  Describing the debate between pros and cons of the DH rule as a contest of “change” and 
“tradition”, Zorn and Gill (2007) investigate whether people’s opinion about the DH rule reflects their 
socio-political backgrounds. Using data from a media monthly poll conducted in September 1997 by 
CBS News, they estimated a logit regression of approval of the DH rule on respondents’ political 
orientation, age, sex, and race. Their main finding is that Democrats are 90 percent more likely to 
support the DH rule than independents and Republicans (p. 193).   
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(MLB) adopted the DH rule in 1973.
3    In Japan, the Pacific League of the Nippon 
Professional Baseball (NPB) adopted the rule in 1975.    One MLB league—the National 
League—and one NPB league—the Central League—never adopted  the  rule.  Professional 
baseball leagues in South Korea, China, and Taiwan all use the DH rule. 
 
Numerous researchers have investigated the DH rule’s effect on the number of hit 
batsmen in the context of pitchers’ moral hazard using MLB and NPB data. The debate was 
prompted by Goff, Shughart and Tollison (1997), hereafter GST (1997), who hypothesized 
that moral hazard by pitchers leads to more hit batsmen in a league with the DH rule.    When 
a pitcher hits an opposing batter, he may face retaliation at his next plate appearance as a 
batter.    Thus he thinks twice even if he is tempted to throw at some player in the opposing 
team’s batting line-up.    The DH rule removes this personal retaliation potential because the 
pitcher no longer has to bat.    GST (1997) argued that the DH rule thus shifts the balance in 
pitchers’ cost-benefit calculation of hitting the opposing batters.    The cost of throwing at 
batters of their personal choice declines, and they respond by hitting more batters. 
 
  Using season data for the American and National Leagues from 1901 to 1990, GST 
(1997) found that batters in the American League were hit by pitches more frequently than 
their National League counterparts from the 1973 season when the American League adopted 
the DH rule.    In regressions that explain annual inter-league hit batsmen differences by the 
use of the DH rule and differences in at-bats, they find that American League batters were hit 
by pitches about 44-50 times more than their counterparts in the National League after the 
American League adopted the DH rule.    This represents an increase of 10-15 percent in the 
number of hit batsmen per season. 
 
Levitt (1998) casts doubts on the moral hazard hypothesis.    Using season data for 
the National and American Leagues for the 1993-1996 seasons, he found that pitchers were 
rarely hit by pitches in the National League, which suggests that they are not necessarily a 
target of retaliation.    Data covering 60 National League pitchers during the 1993-1996 
seasons does not support the hypothesis that pitchers who frequently hit opposing batters 
were hit more often by opposing pitchers.    Trandel, White and Klein (1998), hereafter TWK 
(1998), also questioned the moral hazard story by arguing that a pitcher merely acts as an 
agent of his team’s manager and that retaliation is rarely directed at pitchers themselves.   
Instead, retaliating against a team’s big slugger provides greater benefits. 
                                                  
3  The American League owners voted 8-4 on January 11, 1973 to experiment with a three-year trial of 
the DH rule.   3
Levitt (1998) and TWK (1998) offered an alternative explanation for the surge in hit 
batsmen that appears to have been prompted by the DH rule.    They argue that the DH rule 
brings about a stronger batting line-up, as weak-hitting pitchers are replaced by designated 
hitters who are usually big sluggers.    Since the opportunity cost to a team of hitting a batter 
is lower when the batter is a good hitter, the presence of the DH in the lineup will lead to 
more hit batsmen.    TWK (1998) amended GST’s (1997) regression specification to allow for 
hit batsmen to be proportional to at-bats and extended their MLB sample by seven seasons 
(1991 to 1997).    In the new regression specification, the DH effect was no longer 
statistically significant. In fact, TWK (1998) found that the DH effect was not detected with 
GST (1997)’s original specification in their extended sample. 
 
  In response to these criticisms, Goff, Shughart and Tollison (1998), hereafter GST 
(1998), acknowledged that the DH effect is not detected when the sample period is extended 
through the 1997 season.    They hypothesized that the entry of two teams into the National 
League in 1993 may have diluted National League pitching and led to more hit batsmen in 
the league, thereby diminishing the size and statistical significance of the DH effects in the 
American League.    They also speculated that the players’ strike in 1994-1995 may have 
affected regression results with the extended sample. 
 
Trandel (2004) focused on the incentives to retaliate and investigated whether 
retaliation ever exists, be it against offending pitchers themselves or against their teammates. 
He argued that if a team retaliates when its own batter has been hit, there should be a positive 
correlation between the number of opposing batters hit by the team’s pitchers and the number 
of hit batsmen on the team.    He acknowledges that retaliation in a broad sense could take the 
form of delayed revenge against the plunking pitcher or his teammates in future games 
between the teams.    To allow for this possibility, Trandel (2004) examined season data on 
hit batsmen by MLB team from the 1960 to 2002 seasons.    He calculated the correlation 
between the deviation from the league average of a team’s own batters hit by pitches and the 
deviation from the league average of a team’s opposing batters hit by pitches.    The 
correlation coefficient (-0.018) is negative, very small, and statistically insignificant.    Since 
opposing batters hit by the team’s pitchers are not positively correlated with team batters hit 
by opposing pitchers, Trandel concludes that there is no evidence for retaliation. 
 
The studies reviewed so far mostly used aggregate season data by league (or by 
team) to investigate the impact of the DH rule in terms of incidence of retaliation and hit 
batsmen.    Bradbury and Drinen (2006) changed the terms of the debate by exploiting MLB   4
game-level  statistics.  Their  sample  encompasses 131,342 MLB games played over the 
course of the 1973- 2003 seasons.    Their regression analysis of individual game statistics 
provides strong evidence that retaliation does exist: Each opposing batter that a team’s pitcher 
hits raises the team’s own hit batsmen by 10 to 15 percent in the same game.    Controlling 
for various factors that include team-specific variables such as batter quality, pitcher quality, 
and game-specific score difference variables, an American League game played with the DH 
is still associated with 5-12 percent more hit batsmen than a National League game played 
without it.    Bradbury and Drinen’s results provide strong support for the moral hazard 
hypothesis grounded in the retaliation threat. 
 
  As Bradbury and Drinen’s sample includes data from interleague games that began 
in 1997, they were able to use these games to remove the potential effect of league-specific 
factors. In interleague games, use of the DH rule is not restricted to teams from the American 
League.    When inter-leagues games are played in the American League team’s stadium, then 
both teams are permitted to use a DH; when games are played in the National League team’s 
stadium, neither team is permitted to use the DH.    Estimation of the impact of the DH rule 
on hit batsmen with just the interleague sample yields a positive DH effect on hit batsmen, 
thus reinforcing the moral hazard story. 
 
Bradbury and Drinen (2007) brings the analysis of this question to new heights by 
using a sample composed of micro-level play-by-play MLB data sets with 641,640 
observations for the 1989-1992 seasons and 584,886 observations from the 1969 and the 
1972-1974 seasons.    Using probit and logit regression models, they regressed a batter being 
hit by a pitch during a particular time at bat on the DH dummy and various variables 
representing game situations.    Regression results were similar for both data sets, with the 
DH rule and higher batter quality associated with a higher probability of the batter being hit. 
Their most striking finding is that “[T]hough pitchers are hit less frequently than other 




  Kawaura and La Croix (2007) investigates the effect of the DH rule with data from 
Japan’s professional baseball leagues.    The adoption of the DH rule among Japanese 
                                                  
4  Stephenson (2004) examined whether starting pitchers and relief pitchers hit batters at different 
rates after switching leagues.    His analysis of data for 206 pitchers who switched leagues did not find 
statistically significant differences in hit batsmen rates for either group of pitchers.  He  concluded 
that his results do not support the moral hazard hypothesis. 
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professional leagues parallels the MLB split and should provide independent tests of 
hypotheses relating to the DH rule and additional insights on the DH debate.    The sample 
consists of data from the 1958-2004 seasons by team: Six teams from the Pacific League 
which began to use the DH in 1975, and six from the Central League which has never used 
the DH.    An absence of entry and exit of teams in Japan during the sample period provides a 
more stable environment for the empirical analysis than in the United States.
5 
 
  Kawaura and La Croix replicates analyses of GST (1997) and TWK (1998) using 
aggregate data from the two Japanese leagues and found that the DH rule was associated with 
more hit batsmen until a strict rule was imposed against “dangerous pitching” in 1989.
6 We 
accounted for the batter quality with team data, and still found that the DH rule led to more 
hit batsmen, thus lending support to the moral hazard story.    One innovation of our analysis 
is the introduction of team defensive strategy in the regression analysis.    A manager of a 
team with poorly performing pitchers may instruct his players to engage in aggressive 
pitching to compensate for their lack of talent.    This strategy is easier to implement when 
pitchers do not have to fear personal retaliation.    Our regression analysis found that the 
impact of team pitching talent on the number of hit batsmen became larger when the DH rule 
was introduced.    Even after controlling for a team’s defensive strategy, we still found that 
the DH rule was associated with a small number of additional hit batsmen.    We conclude by 
acknowledging that it is difficult to distinguish econometrically whether increases in hit 
batsmen were due to moral hazard by pitchers or to changes in team defensive strategy. 
 
Kawaura (2010) focuses on individual pitchers, and questions whether their 
calculation of the costs and benefits associated with hitting a batter shifted in the direction 
discussed in GST (1997).    He argues that if a pitcher begins to throw at opposing batters as 
soon as the DH rule is in place, it could embarrass his fans.    To the extent that team owners 
are concerned with ticket revenues, loss of fans would in turn lower the demand for his 
service among them.    There could also be fewer off-field commercial opportunities such as 
public appearances and product endorsements.    When these costs of hitting batters are large 
                                                  
5  Some teams did switch cities during the sample period. 
 
6  The 1989 rule change in Japan gave umpires the authority to remove the pitcher (and his manager) 
when they judged that the pitcher engaged in dangerous pitching.    Kawaura and LaCroix (2007) 
assigned separate dummies for two DH periods with and without the “dangerous balls” rule.    A 
similar rule was introduced in MLB in 1994; it provided for a “double-warning” to both teams against 
intentional hit batsmen and provided authority to remove a pitcher intentionally throwing at batters. 
The DH rule literature based on the MLB data has, however, not incorporated its effect in the 
empirical analyses of determinants of hit batsmen.   6
enough, a pitcher may resist the temptation to plunk a batter even if he need not be afraid of 
retaliation. 
 
As this reputation effect is assumed to be of greater relevance for established 
pitchers, Kawaura investigates behavioral changes of six Pacific League pitchers who played 
consecutively during the 1969-1980 seasons.    Thus, each of these pitchers played six 
seasons without the DH rule and six seasons with the DH rule.    Panel analysis of the number 
of batsmen hit by these pitchers did not produce results consistent with the moral hazard 
hypothesis, as the number of batters hit by these pitchers did not increase even after they no 
longer had to appear at the plate in the offensive capacity.    Shortening the sample period to 
ten years to increase the number of eligible pitchers to eleven did not alter the regression 
results.  
 
Kawaura argues that the absence of behavioral changes among veteran players who 
experienced the adoption of the DH rule midway through their career is compatible with the 
DH effect on hit batsmen previously identified in the DH rule debate.      This is because 
pitchers who began to play when the DH rule was already in effect did not have a reputation 
to protect and thus could hit batters more frequently compared with pitchers who played in 
the pre-DH period.    A changeover of pitcher composition from the latter to the former could 
have raised the aggregate number of hit batsmen per team even when veteran pitchers did not 
alter their behavior. 
 
II. IS THE DH RULE A GOOD NATURAL EXPERIMENT? 
 
  The studies that attempt to identify the DH rule’s effect on hit batsmen typically 
compare data generated in the league that allows the use of the DH with those from the 
non-DH league.    One could argue that this comparison constitutes a natural experiment, as 
the non-DH league serves as the control group, while the DH league constitutes the “treated” 
sample.    This section evaluates the validity of this claim.   
  
  We begin by reviewing criteria that should be met for the data sample to be considered 
the result of a natural experiment.    Meyer (1995) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) 
provide two excellent surveys of the natural experiment framework as applied by economists.   
Meyer defines a “good natural experiment” as one “in which there is a transparent exogenous 
source of variation in the explanatory variables that determine the treatment assignment” (p. 
151).  Typically,  there  are  available data both before and after the treatment and there is an   7
untreated comparison group that is exposed to the same types of influences as the treated 
group.
7    Studies tend to be more reliable when there is less attrition (or addition) of 
observations in either the treatment or control groups.      Meyer (p. l57) argued that the 
experimental design can be strengthened when there are multiple comparison groups. 
 
Economists have studied a wide range of topics with the natural experiment 
framework, including the effect of job training programs on earnings, the effect of class size 
on standardized test outcomes, and the effect of exogenous changes in fertility on the labor 
supply of married women.    Angrist’s (1990) study of the effect of veteran status on 
individual earnings is a good example of a natural experiment.    Estimating how veteran 
status affects earnings is complicated because individuals do not randomly select military 
service.    Individuals with poor health (and therefore potentially lower incomes) are screened 
out by the military, while those who enlist in the military may have different labor market 
opportunities than those who do not serve.    Angrist (1990) overcame the second selection 
problem by examining the labor market outcomes of men who were randomly drafted into the 
army during World War II and the Vietnam War.    Induction into the Army during the 
Vietnam War was based on a draft lottery, while induction during World War II was based on 
a man’s date of birth.
8    Thus, he argues that regression estimates of the effect of veteran 
status on earnings using this sample are more likely to provide unbiased estimates of the 
effects of veteran status on earnings. 
 
How well does the natural experiment framework fit the adoption of the DH rule by 
one of two leagues in North America and Japan?   Several  conditions  are  clearly  met.  First, 
the nature of competition between teams in both the treated and the control leagues are 
virtually identical but for the DH rule.    Second, there are multiple years of data (by season) 
on player, team, and fan behavior prior to and after the adoption of the DH rule.    Third, 
there is no attrition by teams in the treated and control groups, although in North America one 
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7  The standard regression is α +α1dt +α
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where the outcome y is now also 
indexed by j for the group, j = 0, 1, and dt= 1 if t=1 and 0 otherwise, di= 1 if j=1 and 0 otherwise, and 
dt = 1if t=1and j=1 and 0 otherwise.  it  is a vector of the observations’ characteristics controlled for 
in the regression.    dj is a dummy variable for being in the experimental group after it receives the 
treatment, and β is the true causal effect of the treatment on the outcome for this group. The key 
identifying assumption is that β would be 0 in the absence of the treatment, or E[εit
j |dt
j] = 0.    See 
Meyer (1995) for a full discussion. 
 
8  While the army randomly chose draftees in both wars, it continued to screen out some men with 
poor health.    Other individuals obtained draft deferments because they were enrolled at institutions 
of higher education.   
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of the two leagues—the National League--adds teams during the period after the American 
League adopted the DH rule.    Finally, there are essentially two parallel experiments 
occurring in two very distant regions of the world; this provides a check on singular results 
that might be generated by the DH rule in a particular country.   
 
Some of the assumptions undergirding the natural experiment framework are, 
however, not supported in either North America or Japan.    Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) 
argued that the major problem with most empirical studies that claim to be natural 
experiments is that “the assumption of randomness [of the treatment] is not credible” (p. 
828).
9    This assumption is also violated in studies of the effect of the DH rule that assume 
that adoption of the DH rule is a random treatment.    We argue that the DH “treatment” was 
not randomly assigned to particular leagues, but was instead selected by both the American 
League and the Pacific League.    Attendance in both leagues had been stagnating relative to 
their sister professional baseball leagues, and baseball team owners and general managers had 
been considering changes in the game to increase interest in baseball.
10    A comparison of 
attendance in the American and National Leagues before and after the introduction of the DH 
rule in 1973 shows that annual attendance per team in the American League increased rapidly 
after the introduction of the DH rule and that the two attendance series closely co-vary from 
1978 (Figure 1).    A parallel comparison of attendance in the Central and Pacific League 
before and after the introduction of the DH rule in 1975 shows a less clear relationship 
between adoption of the DH rule and league attendance (Figure 2).    There is, however, a 
change from no growth in attendance in the Pacific League over the decade prior to the DH 
rule adoption to small positive growth over the next decade (1975-1984), followed by high 
growth over the next six years  (1985-1990).  While  the  evidence is stronger for North 
American baseball, the introduction of the DH rule is associated with changes in the growth 
rate of attendance in North American and Japanese professional leagues.
11 
                                                  
9  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (p. 828) identify five naturally occurring phenomena that “are plausibly 
random with respect to at least two of the major sources of heterogeneity in human populations:   
tastes and abilities”.    They are “twin births, human cloning (monozygotic twins), birth date, gender, 
and weather events.” Rosenzweig and Wolpin (p. 872) concluded their survey of econometric studies 
using natural instruments on a clearly cautionary note: “It is evident that natural events used as 
instruments do not provide estimates that can be unambiguously interpreted, although the range of 
possible alternative interpretations may have been reduced.” 
 
10  In 1969, both the National and American Leagues lowered the height of the mound from 15 to 10 
inches.   
 
11  Other events also affected attendance in the American and Pacific Leagues in the late 1960s and 
early1970s.    La Croix and Kawaura (1995) found that the introduction in 1966 of a new system for 
allocating young players to teams—the player draft—substantially increased a number of measures of   9
  Another problem with viewing the change to the DH rule as a natural experiment is 
that the composition of players in each league changed after the introduction of the DH rule.   
Teams in the league with the DH had incentives to trade good-hitting pitchers to teams in the 
other league that would place a higher value on their hitting skills.    Tollison and Vasilescu 
(2007) developed and tested this hypothesis using data on the offensive and defensive 
performance of 6,052 MLB pitchers for the 1960-1985 seasons.
12 A principal finding is that 
National League teams were more likely to trade poor-hitting pitchers to the American 
League in the two seasons (1972 and 1973) bracketing the introduction of the DH rule in 
April 1973. This association is not observed before 1972 or after 1973.    One implication of 
Tollison and Vasilescu’s results is that the existence of these trades makes it more difficult to 
view the introduction of the DH as a natural experiment, as the skills of the pitchers in the 
National League changed in anticipation of the rule change. 
 
  Kawaura and La Croix (2010) examine whether there was a similar surge in 
inter-league pitcher trade activities in Japan’s two professional leagues in the years leading 
up to and including the adoption of the DH rule by the Pacific League in 1975.    For 
example, trades of pitchers from teams in the Central League to teams in the Pacific League 
averaged 2.93 over the1958-1971 period; they increased substantially, to 9.25, over the 
1972-1975 period.    Trades of pitchers from teams in the Pacific League to teams in the 
Central League also increased, from an average of 2.93 in the 1958-1971 period to 9.25 over 
the 1972-1975 period. 
Following Tollison and Vasilescu’s hypothesis, were the pitchers traded to the 
Central League better hitters than the pitchers traded to the Pacific League over the 
1972-1975 period?    Kawaura and La Croix (2010) find that the average on-base percentage 
and the average slugging average (OPS) for pitchers traded to the Central League was higher 
than for pitchers traded to the Pacific League.    A t-test that the two league averages are 
equal is rejected at the 10 percent level of statistical significance. 
 
There is also some evidence that National League attendance would not have reacted 
in the same way to the introduction of the DH rule as American League attendance.
13  
                                                                                                                                                           
competitive balance in Japan’s Pacific League.    Fort and Quirk (1995) found virtually identical 
results for MLB’s American League. In both cases, more within-league competition should be 
expected to increase league attendance.   
 
12  Since American League pitchers had no offensive opportunities after 1973, their batting ability 
cannot be observed and they had to be dropped from the sample after this year. 
 
13  In other words, the effect of treatment on the control group would not have been the same as the   10
Domazlicky and Kerr (1990) estimated a regression model for MLB team attendance using 
data from the 1969-1980 seasons for 21 U.S.-based MLB teams that did not change their 
location during the sample period.    The estimated coefficient on number of runs scored is 
positive and statistically significant in the American League sub-sample, while it is 
statistically insignificant in the National League sub-sample.    Since the DH rule would be 
expected to produce more runs per game, Domazlicky and Kerr’s results provide some 
insights into the National League’s decision to reject the DH rule and the American League’s 
decision to adopt it.   
 
  Finally, we take note of the addition of new teams to the National League in 1990 
while the DH rule was in effect in the American League.    Since the presence of new teams 
reduced the quality of all team rosters for an undetermined period of time, this effect may 
have contributed to estimates of differences in behavior due to the presence of the DH rule. 
We note that the two Japan leagues did not add or drop teams between 1958 and 2004, 





  The DH rule is unique among baseball rules because professional baseball leagues in 
the United States and Japan have not uniformly adopted it.    In the context of a natural 
experiment framework, researchers have engaged in a long-running debate regarding the 
relationship between the DH rule and increases in hit batsmen.    The issue is whether the 
moral hazard of pitchers contributed to increases in hit batsmen after the DH rule was enacted.   
Empirical analyses using aggregate season data have come to different results, while studies 
based on disaggregated game data and play-by-play data clearly revealed pitcher moral 
hazard. 
 
  On a closer look, however, the asymmetry in the status of the DH rule in two 
countries was not sufficient to produce a true natural experiment, as its adoption by the 
American and Pacific Leagues was endogenous, an attempt by both leagues to increase fan 
attendance and interest in their games.    While the presence of one league without the DH 
                                                                                                                                                           
effect of treatment on the treated group. 
 
14  Two teams in the Pacific League (Bluewaves and Buffaloes) merged after the 2004 season. There 
was an entry (Golden Eagles) immediately following this merger, which maintained the number of 
teams at six in the following seasons . 
   11
rule appears to offer a control group for regression analysis, studies of both U.S. and Japanese 
professional leagues show that inter-league player trades were conducted to optimize team 
rosters at the time of the adoption of the DH rule by one league in each country. 
 
  In sum, the DH rule in the North American and Japanese professional baseball 
leagues continues to offer opportunities to researchers to study a rule’s effect on various 
aspects of the sport.    For example, the rule allows a partial division of offensive and 
defensive strategies in baseball, which could change the required talents of a team manager 
depending on the status of the DH rule in the league.    Another potential issue is the 
recruitment of rookie pitchers to professional teams.    Because the DH rule diminishes the 
importance of hitting talents of pitchers, it could have consequences on the scouting decisions 
of professional teams as well as on the behavior of amateur players.   12
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